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1. Introduction 
This short survey on the Bulgarian corporate governance issues follows the European Corporate Governance Survey guidelines as 
well as the structure and layout of the respective survey on Estonian case. 
Due to late joining the project it is incomplete. The tables present just the legislative aspect of the problem and the data is still under 
preparation. 
The following are some specifics for Bulgarian Corporate Governance which seem important for its understanding. 
 
1.1 Origin of the CG issue 
It won‟t be wrong to say that the problem as in all other Transition countries originates from the process of privatization s ince the plan 
economy was simply ignoring it. Although it will be much correct to say that in Bulgaria it emerged within a night when more than 
1000 companies which property was already distributed free to the citizens and privatization funds were accepted for traded on the 
Stock Exchange. 
 
1.2 The intentional CG 
Mass privatization scheme had seen those companies generally having one two biggest shareholders and great number of smaller ones 
(mostly individual) trading the stock among each other on the Stock Exchange. That‟s for the policy makers prohibited obtaining 
blocks higher than 34%, centralized all the trade obligatory through one market and created the Central Depository as a ultimate 
keeper of the security accounts and also executor of the clearing and settlement of all trade. Further, there was a 6–month ban for 
transfer of the blocks obtained in the mass privatization after the last auction. This was an attempt to stop the already going process of 
setting agreements for exchange of the blocks mostly between privatization funds but also with some foreign portfolio investors. 
 
1.3 Failure of the good intentions 
Not surprisingly the process failed. As it appeared the weak barriers could not prevent the agreements between the funds. And as it 
appeared the interest for gathering larger and larger blocks was practically total. Thus the trade in those securities realized mainly as 
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block trades. The pressure was intensive enough to make government allowing the block trade almost without any obstacles
2
 and it is 
still going. Needless to say that at that time this trade was just a formal registration of the deal at the price wanted (and agreed) outside 
the floor of the SE. The mechanisms those days and still prevents practically 100 percent the possibility of intervention among the 
consent parties. 
 
1.4 Reasoning  
One can be equally right blaming as the policy makers for allowing the lobbing groups to obtain desirable decisions as well as the 
investment society which was short seeing and missed to establish self restricting rules  which will make the investing process reliable 
and trustworthy. Today when most of the investment intermediaries changed their behavior and try to impose more strict trading rules 
the things have gone so far. Although, both of those blames are not enough elaborated. The actual reason upon me is the process itself: 
First, most of the companies simply could not fit any criterion to be public – badly performing, small, outdated technology, shrunk 
markets etc. 
Second, the process was set out with two completely unequal parties – 81 big and aggressive privatization funds and millions of 
citizens who never new what does it mean to invest in securities plus a week legal protection for the small (minority) investors.  
Third, the privatization plus carteling agreements between funds the latter were able to obtain for very cheap a huge and valuable 
stock. 
Given that framework it appeared possible and highly desirable for the ultimate investors to try to concentrate as much shares as 
possible in most companies, because that allowed them to collect all the margin to the market price. Moreover, for many of those 
shareholders that was the only goal to have. 
                                               
2 Except a short period suspension in 1997. 
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1.5 The Results 
Definitely the immediate result of such a behavior was a large concentration of the ownership. The following table shows the 
concentration of the ownership right after the mass privatization. 
Ownership and Corporate Control in Mass Privatized Companies 
 Exclusive 
Majority Control 
Shared Majority 
Control 
Exclusive 
Minority Control 
Shared Minority 
Control 
Limited Minority 
Control 
Control by 
Constellation of 
Interests 
Control Unde-
fined by Mass 
Privatis. 
Companies  
- number 
- % from the all  
 
267 
26 
 
143 
13.75 
 
159 
15 
 
131 
12,6 
 
27 
2.6 
 
48 
4.6 
 
264 
25 
Capital ('000'BGL) 
- total in the group 
- average per co 
- median of the 
group 
 
19,574,018 
73,311 
43,764 
 
21,509,043 
150,413 
65,296 
 
11,448,649 
72,004.08 
37,319 
 
22,467,420 
171,507 
95,400 
 
2,788,176 
103,266 
51,897 
 
830,798 
17,308 
10,157 
 
153,610,012 
581,856 
- 
Average final 
privatised stack of a 
company (%) 
 
78.05 
 
70.57 
 
73.55 
 
60.10 
 
69.67 
 
82.44 
 
19.94 
Avr stake in a 
company % 
- of the “couple”  
   - only of the 
leading PF 
   - only of the 
second PF 
 
59.00 
33.48 
25.53 
 
52.32 
32.94 
19.38 
 
41.36 
31.22 
8.58 
 
N/A* 
29.41 
10.99 
 
NA* 
14.51 
9.23 
 
0.02** 
 
 
 
- 
8.14 
1.33 
- of the 3rd PF 
- sum of 3rd,4th and 
5th PF 
- sum of all citizens' 
stacks 
3.54 
3.87 
15.18 
5.12 
6.00 
12.25 
1.57 
1.84 
31.91 
5.86 
7.36 
12.30 
5.55 
9.46 
36.15 
 
 
82.42 
 
 
10.00 
* not applicable 
** all institutional investors  
Source: Centre for Mass Privatisation 
As it may be seen easily more than fifthly percent of the companies are majority (or close 41.36 average controlling block for the third 
group) controlled. The process is rather underestimated since in many cases there were more than three funds participating in the 
agreement and also not all of the “funds couples” were not detected. 
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Later the process speeded up and the following table is quite persuasive of that. 
 
Concentration in the Public Companies mid 1999 
STACKES OF THE BIGGEST SHAREHOLDER No of companies 
more than 66.7% of the capital 257 
between 50%  and 66.7%  357 
between 33.3 and 66.7% 298 
less than 33.3% 230 
including those with biggest holding less than 10%; “constellation of interests 51 
Source: Central Depository Cit. by S. Petranov (2000) 
The second result, much more comprehensive and far going was the complete collapse of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange. Even the few 
foreign portfolio investors operating for some time in Bulgaria withdrew. Bulgarian investors, and not only the individuals, after some 
unsuccessful attempts gave up to risk their money on the market.  
Mass practice became the abuse of the minority shareholders by number of means, conditional rises of companies‟ capital, closure and 
official withdrawal of the companies from the market (after that became possible in 2000). Today the bourse index SOFIX, which 
actually was re-started in 2000, is at the level of 70% and the turnover is insignificant. 
1.6 Measures Targeted on Improvement of the Situation 
A number of actions were taken out to stop the deterioration of the situation. First of all legal changes some of which having a CG 
aspect. The Law on securities was completely replaced which is rather rare practice in this country; the new one having a number of 
clauses ensuring a better protection of the minority shareholders. The cases of conditional increase of the capital were dramatically 
limited, the 5% threshold for rising a motion, including court appeal for managers‟ misconduct, was introduced. 
Another aspect was improving the trading rules on the floor of the Exchange. Several times were changed the rules for price corridors, 
efforts were done for preventing some types of deals including package sales, but block trading remained. A lot of rules for a better 
disclosure policies were made, including participating interests, large holding directives etc, which are treated in more detail later on. 
Although, there are no serious improvements on the market. This actually was one of the strongest points for political attack in the  
economic program of the former Bulgarian king, which definitely helped him to win decisively the recent elections. 
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2. LEGAL FORMS  
2.1. COMPANY TUPES AND GROUPS 
2.1.A. LEGAL FORMS 
 
Legal Forms 
LIMITED 
LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIP 
JOINT 
STOCK 
COMPANY  
PUBLIC  
COMPANY 
 
SOLE 
PROPRI-
ETOR 
 
GENERAL 
PARTNERSHIP HYBRID COMPANIES 
LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP*** 
PARTNERSHIP 
LIMITED BY 
SHARES*** 
Names of the 
legal forms: 
Druzhestvo s 
ogranichena 
otgovornost OOD 
Akzionerno 
druzhestvo AD 
 
 
Publichno 
druzhestvo  
Ednoliche
n 
Targovetz  
ET                  
Subiratelno 
druzhestvo SD 
Komanditno 
druzhestvo KD 
Komanditno druzhestvo s 
akcii KDA 
Main features: 
Limited versus 
unlimited 
liability 
Limited liability Limited liability Limited 
liability 
Unlimited 
liability 
Unlimited liability General partner-
unlimited liability; 
limited partner-
liability limited to his 
contribution 
General partner-unlimited 
liability; limited partners-
liability limited to his 
contribution 
Minimum 
Capital 
5000 BGN* 
 
 
50 000 BGN 200 000 None No minimum. The 
amount of the 
contributions is 
agreed upon in the 
partnership 
agreement 
No minimum. 
The amount of the 
contributions is 
agreed upon in the 
memorandum of 
association 
No minimum. 
The amount of the 
contributions is agreed upon 
in the memorandum of 
association 
Smallest 
Number of 
Owners 
One or more 
persons 
One or more 
persons 
50  Two or more 
partners 
Two or more persons 
at least one is general 
partner 
At least three limited 
partners 
Smallest 
Number of 
Managers 
Managing  
Board less than 9  
Supervisory  
Board 3-7** 
Managing  
Board less than 
9  
Supervisory  
Board 3-7** 
Managing  
Board less 
than 9  
Supervisory  
Board 3-7** 
 Min one (general 
partner) 
One or more persons  
Limited liability 
partners are excluded 
from managing board 
Managing board 
encompasses exclusively 
unlimited partners 
* 1BGN=1DM 
** If the management is 1-tier Supervisory board should encompass 3-9 persons. 
***These are the official translations – Bulgarian names are translations from Komandit Gesellshaft and Kommandit Gesellschaft auf Aktien 
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2.1.B. GROUPS 
The Law on Accountancy and the rules on drawing up consolidated accounts determine the economic group as a totality of the parental company with all of 
its subsidiaries. The couple parent-subsidiary emerges where the first has the control over the latter. And the control is present where the parental company has: 
(1) more than 50% of the shares or parts in the capital of any other undertaking or  
(2) more than 50% of the voting rights in the managing bodies or  
(3) even with less share has the power: 
- over more than 50% of the voting rights pursuant to an agreement with other investors  
- to mange the company pursuant to a provision in its memorandum or articles of association 
- to appoint or remove more than 50% of the members of the managing body 
- to control more than 50% of the voting rights in the managing body.3 
Commercial Code provides a definition of the holding – a limited liability company which keeps at least 25% of its capital as a participating interest in 
subsidiary(es). A subsidiary is such, when at least 25% of its capital is controlled directly or indirectly by the holding or more than 50% of the members of its 
Management board are appointed directly by the holding. 
The Law on Protection of Competition uses the broad concept of concentration, which emerges from mergers and acquisitions or when one or more persons 
controlling one or more undertakings acquire by any means direct or indirect control over another undertaking; control is assumed always were a person(s) has a 
decisive influence over an undertaking obtained through acquiring of property rights over the undertaking or other, including contractual rights over its managing 
bodies or their decisions.4 
The Law on Banking regulates a bank‟s exposition toward a group of connected persons (legal and physical), a concept which treats vast number of cases but 
is not clear about the legal persons member of a an economic group. It also provides a definition for banking group, each case where bank‟s subsidiary is a bank, 
non-baking financial institution or both, and for financial holding  a case where an undertaking (industrial) has a bank for its subsidiary. 
                                               
3 The definition is dispersed between the law and its appendices and it is not fully persistent and clear which make it difficult to apply 
4 There are a lot of exceptions one of which is for financial holdings, i.e. it is used the Commercial Code Definition. 
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3. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND VOTING RIGHS       3.1.  OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE RULES       3.1. A. COMPANY LAW 
 
Legal Forms 
LIMITED 
LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIP 
JOINT STOCK 
COMPANY  
PUBLIC COMPANY 
 
SOLE 
PROP
RI-
ETOR 
GENERAL 
PARTNER-
SHIP 
HYBRID COMPANIES 
LIMITED 
PARTNERS
HIP 
PARTNERSHI
P LIMITED 
BY SHARES 
Register when the 
company is founded 
Commercial 
Register (CR) 
Commercial Register Commercial Register Comme
rcial 
Register 
Commercial 
Register 
Commercial 
Register 
Commercial 
Register 
Documents that the 
company has to deposit 
when the company is 
founded 
 
Request and 
Partnership 
contract with List 
of partners 
containing names 
and addresses 
Memorandum of association, 
statutes, minutes of the foun-
dation meeting with the 
names of the founding 
shareholders 
Memorandum of asso-
ciation, statutes, minutes 
of the foundation 
meeting with the names 
of the founding 
shareholders 
Request 
with 
name 
and 
address 
Request and 
Partnership 
contract with 
List of part-
nears contain-
ing names and 
addresses 
Request and 
Partnership 
contract with 
List of partners 
containing 
names and 
addresses 
Request and 
Partnership 
contract * 
What is the legal procedure 
for transferring shares? 
 
Transfer b/n part-
ners free; transfer 
to the third parties 
with the consent of 
the General 
Assembly of the 
partners. The 
transfer is regis-
tered in the CR. 
Bearer‟s shares completely 
freely transferable. 
Registered transfer with 
notification to the Book of 
the shareholders.*** 
Non-materialised shares tran-
sfer through notification to 
Central Depository  
The shares of the public 
company are non-
materialised and could 
be transferred through 
the Central Depository 
with an obligatory 
notification. 
  Not treated ** Not treated* 
Limits on Directors to hold 
ownership in the company 
No No No  No   
Limits on the Directors to 
purchase ownership 
certificates in the name of 
the company 
 In general not allowed. If the 
company acquire own shares 
it is in specific temporary 
case and the rights are 
suspended. 
Generally not allowed. If 
the company acquire 
own shares it is in speci-
fic temporary case and 
the rights are suspended. 
    
Company notification for 
acquisitions or holdings of a 
stake in another company 
Generally, the company does not have to notify when it acquires or holds a stake in another company. Although in cases of acquisition of holdings 
in public companies reporting is required to the Central Depository, which keeps the Shareholder‟s books. These are the cases covered by the 
disclosure rules and shown in detail below. The thresholds are different  according to whether the company is listed or not. The information is 
centralised and computerised. One can get the information on companies for a fee, in paper format, or electronic format (data on a disk, or through 
an online connection). The quality of the centralised information is generally high. 
* The law stipulates that this legal form follows generally the regulation of the LLC with shares if no special provisions  ** It follows the general low on the 
General partnerships if no special provisions  *** The company can prescribe a different procedure in the statutes. 
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3.1.B. ACCOUNTING RULES 
Ownership Information that companies must enclose in the 
annex of their annual reports 
 
Yes, for the public ones. The  law on Securities requires disclosure of the stacks 
above 10 percent in an undertaking. 
According to  Accounting Law consolidated accounts are drawn where a company 
has more than 50% participating interest and in those cases the relevant ownership 
information is disclosed. Participating interests between 25 and 50% are accumulated.  
Which national laws have transposed the accounting standards 
directives (4th Directive 78/660/EEC and 7th Directive 
83/349/EEC)? 
The Law on Accounting and the National Accounting Standards follow both 
directives though, not in all details.  
Has the Accession State imposed additional requirements via its 
national accounting standards? 
No. According to the accounting standards, the threshold for „significant interest‟, 
which apparently corresponds to the participating interest from 78/660 EEC is higher 
25%. 
Is the information from this source only available on paper (the 
printed annual report) or in the computer readable form? 
The information of the annual reports on public companies is available also in 
electronic form through the Commission on Securities. 
 
3.1.C. COMPETITITION RULES 
 
Are there any competition (anti-trust) rules on ownership stake 
notifications that apply to companies? 
 
According to the Law on Protection of Competition all cases of concentration (see 2.1.B.) 
including mergers, acquisitions, purchasing of stock etc. should be reported if the 
accumulated market share exceeds 20% or the aggregate turnover for the preceding year of 
the merging parties exceeds 15 million BGN.  
To whom do the companies have to notify and where the data is 
published? 
 
 
To the Commission for Protection of Competition which takes decision within a month of 
notification. If the Commission decides that the case threatens the competition it starts 
inquiry. The decision for the latter is published in the Official Gazette. 
 
3.1.D. TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE 
The large holdings directive` is in essence rather stringent on what should be considered a indirect holding, in Article 2 is for example declared that “[f]or the 
purposes of Directive, „acquiring a holding‟ shall mean not only purchasing a holding, but also acquisition by any other means whatsoever, including acquisition 
in one of the situations referred to in Article 7.”5 The latter paragraph, in turn, gives a rather comprehensive list of what kind of instances that should be 
considered an acquisition. Bulgaria has indeed implemented most of the provisions which are expressly noted in the directive. In addition there is in the 
Bulgarian transposition also a direct mentioning of the fact that share held by spouses and minors should be included (except when the person in question is 
unable to influence the exercising of the voting rights). 
                                               
5
 88/627/EEC, Article 2, emphasis added. 
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When was the Transparency Directive transposed, and in what 
law/regulation? 
With the new Law on Public Offering of Securities (adopted on 15 December 
1999/published on 30 December 1999)(this law meant that the Law for Securities, Stock 
Exchanges and Investment Companies from July 1995 was repealed)  and the consecutive 
decree 244 of 24 November 2000 on the adoption of an Ordinance on the Disclosure of 
Major Holdings in Public and Investment Companies 
When did the legislation become effective? (or, when is it estimated 
to become effective?) 
November 2000 
If there was a delay, what was the reason? N/A. 
Which are the "competent authorities or authorities" referred to in 
Article 13? 
The Bulgarian National Securities Commission (http://www.ssec.bg) – in addition reporting 
by the blockholder on purchases/sales should be made to “the regulated securities market on 
which the companies shares are listed” (Art. 2), e.g. the Bulgarian Stock Exchange 
(http://www.bse-sofia.bg) 
The Transparency Directive left the Member States a considerable 
degree of freedom in implementing the individual articles (see text of 
directive in Appendix). Indeed, Article 3 allows the Member States 
to tighten up the transposition at will, converting the provisions of 
the directive into common minimum standards – has this been done? 
They are tighter in some respects, e.g.: (i) the rules apply to all public companies; (ii) the 
data is made public on a website; and (iii) in the case of an increase in the block it is 
mandatory to declare whether the aim is to control the company (Art. 6, para. 2, item 3d). 
At the same time, however, some minor provisions in the directive are not covered (see table 
above). 
Is the first time notification threshold referred to in Article 5 10% or 
lower? 
There is no explicit first time notification in the Bulgarian rules. However, indirectly such 
notification is catered for in Art. 2 which states that notification is mandatory for all persons 
“whose voting rights has reached, exceeded or fallen below...” [emphasis added]. 
The minimum threshold applied is 5 per cent for companies on the official market on a stock 
exchange (i.e. tiers A, B and C on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange) and 10 per cent for 
companies whose shares are listed on a regulated securities market other than the stock 
exchange. 
Do natural persons or legal entities have to notify why they notified 
(i.e. which of the possibilities in Article 7 apply)? 
Art. 6, para. 2, item 3b and 3c may be interpreted in this way. In practice, however, the 
notification forms in question are still not prepared by the SSEC and the notification is made 
as before in a non-standardised way. 
Do natural persons or legal entities have to notify how they control 
an undertaking (a, b or c in Article 8)? 
Yes, art 8 requires the form of control to be disclosed if different from control through direct 
ownership of voting rights shares; in practice this seems to mean the cases 5 to 8 of Art 2 
para 2. Again, however, there is no practice, since there is no form. 
4. Inside supervision    4.1.Boards 4.1.A. Legal and institutional description  
4.1.A.1. BOARD STRUCTURE 
Legally available board structure (one- or two-tier board)? Yes, Commercial code determines one and two-tier board structure of the  companies – 
either Board of Directors (BD) or Management Board (MB) and Supervisory Board (SB) 
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Are they the same for all legal forms? Limited liability partnerships are managed by Manager and Controller. 
Shares companies, including the public ones, could have either one-tier or two-tier. 
Are there different categories of directors and/or managers? Under one-tier system the smaller part (or just one)  are Executive Directors.  
What are their titles (in the original language)? In case of one-tier – Savet na Directorite (BD) 
In case of two-tier Upravitelen Savet (MB) and Nadzoren Savet (SB) 
What are their functions? Supervisory board- gives orders and supervise the management board, exclusively beyond 
the scope of everyday economic activities, the functions can be limited or extended by the 
statutes within the limits of the law. Management board- represents and directs the 
company, follows the orders of and reports to the supervisory board, organise the 
accounting. 
What are their powers? One-tier The whole BD appoints the Executives and they run the company 
Two-tier The Supervisory board- hire and fire the members of the management board.* 
Does the chairman of the board of directors have a veto power 
or a “golden vote”? 
No. Commercial Code states exclusively that the members of all boards have equal rights 
and obligations regardless of their internal division of functions. 
By whom are directors/managers nominated, appointed (and for 
how long), re-appointed, promoted, removed, remunerated? 
Board of Directors or Supervisory board- elected, and removed by the general meeting. 
Term of five years, or shorter time by the statutes. The first boards for no more than 3 years. 
Remuneration determined by the resolution of the general meeting. 
Management board- elected and removed by the supervisory board. Term not exclusively 
determined. Remuneration determined by SB. 
How are these decisions taken (majority voting, unanimity)? Simple majority voting. 
Does anybody have veto power? No. 
Are the nomination and appointment rules set out in company 
law, the company statute, imposed by the stock exchange? 
Commercial codes impose few requirements for the members of the boards but leaves space 
for the company statutes, to impose restrictions if needed. 
Is it possible to obtain a list with the names of persons who sit 
on the board and in the various committees for each company? 
The list and all the changes are reported to the Commercial Register. 
And especially for the public companies they should be reported in the Annual Reports. 
Is it possible to find out how much the individual directors and 
managers earn (pay, bonuses, stock options)? 
For the public companies, according to the rules for disclosing of information of the Law on 
securities  the annual report should contains the information about their remuneration 
received against their services in the boards. 
Do directors have to declare how many shares in their own 
company they posses and when they buy and sell? 
For the public companies, according to the rules for disclosing of information of the Law on 
securities  the annual report should contains the information about the directly and indirectly 
owned voting shares, their percent in the GM votes and to report when they exceed or fall 
between 5 (or rounded to 5) percent for the listed and 10,25,33,50,66 or 75% for the 
registered companies.   
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Is it possible for a shareholder/member of the public to obtain a 
copy of the managers employment contract/the directors 
employment contracts? 
No. 
*The Commercial Code is quite abstract in setting out the rights and obligations of the Board. Such issues should be defined more precisely in the statutes of the 
company as well as the employment contracts signed with the board members. Thus, if there is a majority shareholder whose votes will determine either directly 
or indirectly the content and approval of the statutes as well as the members of the supervisory board, then the law does not leave too much ground for the 
protection of minor shareholders‟ interest. 
 
 
4.1. B. Manager Independence 
For which business decision must the managers seek approval 
by the shareholder meeting and/or the board and/or worker 
representatives? 
Transformations, and termination of the company, increase and reduction of share capital, 
issue of convertible bonds- resolved by the general meeting; the GM may have more rights 
if stated in the statutes. 
Termination or sale of the enterprises or their essential parts, significant changes in the 
business activities of the company, essential organisational changes, establishing or 
termination of long-lasting partnership, opening of a branch – needed approval by the 
Supervisory Board or unanonymous decision of the Board of Directors.  
Although the Commercial code provides an opportunity GM to entrust the decision of rising 
capital with the MD or BD in some cases. 
In particular, do these decisions include financing decisions 
(IPOs, new equity issues, bond issues, bank loans, use of 
derivative products)? 
Yes, new equity issues are among the restricted decisions.  
Is approval granted by the majority voting? By qualified majority of the votes present at the GM.  
Is the catalogue of decisions that the managers cannot take 
independently set out in the company statute, laid down by the 
company law, stock exchange or other regulation? 
Some requirements are set out in the company law, however, the company can extend their 
decision-making rights by the statutes.  
Are managers allowed to buy shares in the company in the name 
of the company? 
In general not allowed. If the company acquire own shares it is in specific temporary case 
and the rights are suspended. 
 
Is the management allowed to vote these shares? 
 
No. 
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4.3. Shareholders 
 
Who has the right to attend the shareholder meeting? 
 
All shareholders with voting rights or their representatives (with proxy voting right), members of the 
managing boards (they do not have voting rights if they are not shareholders). 
Is it possible to delegate (or transfer) voting rights to 
third parties? 
Yes, through proxy voting 
What majority is required to change the company 
statute? 
At least 2/3 of the votes represented at the general meeting, or a different threshold if set out in the 
statute. 
Can this required majority be increased or decreased 
in the company statute? 
Commercial code allows for the company statute to state a different majority? 
Is it possible to obtain a copy of the attendance list 
of the shareholder meeting as a shareholder/as a 
member of the public? 
Yes, as a shareholder. 
Is it possible to obtain the minutes of the annual 
meeting with the results of the votes for each item 
on the agenda? 
Yes, as a shareholder. 
What other information do the minutes contain? Place and time of the GM, names of the chairman and secretary and counters of votes, presence of the 
boards‟ members as well as outsiders (non-shareholders), raised motions, votes and taken decisions, 
the objections (dissenting opinions). The list of the attendees and the preliminary documents are 
appended to the minutes. 
Can shareholder ask the management to disclose 
whether the company holds stakes in other 
companies? 
Yes, for the public companies.  
For the others the issue is not treated so they can ask, but the management has no obligation  to 
disclose such information, especially if that might cause damage to the interests of the company. 
How many shares (voting rights) does the 
shareholder need to own to make such a request? 
irrelevant 
ACE Project on Corporate Governance and Disclosure in the Accession Process, Closing conference, Portoroz 23 June 2001 
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